CSc 466/566

Computer Security

5 : Cryptography — Basics


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
Christian Collberg

Outline




Block Ciphers

• Block ciphers work on one block of data at a time. Different ciphers use different block size and key length:



Block Ciphers

 Block ciphers work on one block of data at a time. Different ciphers use different block size and key length:



- Cryptographic systems are sensitive to the environment.
- The strength of a cryptosystem depends on how it is used.
- Just because a cryptosystem is mathematically strong doesn't mean it's secure – it can be vulnerable to various attacks when used incorrectly.
- Attacks can be carried out in many ways besides guessing the key.

Precomputing the Possible Message: If the plaintexts is drawn from a small set, attacker can just encipher all the plaintexts using the public key and search the intercepted ciphertext in database to find the corresponding plaintext (dictionary attack). Precomputing the Possible Message: If the plaintexts is drawn from a small set, attacker can just encipher all the plaintexts using the public key and search the intercepted ciphertext in database to find the corresponding plaintext (dictionary attack).

Misordered Blocks: If different parts of ciphertext are not bound together, the attacker can delete, replay and reorder the ciphertext without being detected. Precomputing the Possible Message: If the plaintexts is drawn from a small set, attacker can just encipher all the plaintexts using the public key and search the intercepted ciphertext in database to find the corresponding plaintext (dictionary attack).

Misordered Blocks: If different parts of ciphertext are not bound together, the attacker can delete, replay and reorder the ciphertext without being detected.

Statistical Regularities: If each part of a message is enciphered separately the ciphertext can give away information about the structure of the message, even if the message itself is unintelligible.

- Key size decides the upper bound of security using exhaustive search.
- Block size larger block is harder to crack but more costly to implement.
- Complexity of cryptographic mapping affect the implementation cost and real-time performance
- Data expansion it is desirable not to increase the size of the data.

Outline



Modes of Operations

- Modes of operation deal with how to encrypt a message of arbitrary length using a block cipher.
- To be useful, a mode must be at least as secure and as efficient as the underlying cipher.
- The most common modes for block ciphers are:
 - Electronic Code Book (ECB)
 - ② Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
 - Oipher Feedback (CFB)
 - Output Feedback(OFB)
 - Ounter (CTR)

ECB Mode

Electronic Codebook


- In ECB mode, each plaintext block is encrypted independently with the block cipher.
- Encryption:


$$C_i \leftarrow E_K(B_i)$$


• Decryption:

$$B_i \leftarrow D_K(C_i)$$

- Notation:
 - B_i is the *i*:th plaintext block.
 - *C_i* is the *i*:th ciphertext block.







ECB Mode: Analysis

- Pros:
 - Simple.
 - Tolerates blocks lost in transit.
 - Easy to parallelize.
- Cons:
 - Identical plaintext blocks (eg. blocks of sky in a jpg) result in identical ciphertext ⇒ data patterns aren't hidden.
- Not suitable for encrypting message longer than one block.
- Example (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_modes_of_operation):

the Phantasy Star Online: Blue Burst online video game uses Blowfish in ECB mode. Before the key exchange system was cracked leading to even easier methods, cheaters repeated encrypted **monster killed** message packets, each an encrypted Blowfish block, to illegitimately gain experience points quickly.[citation needed]

Message Padding


• What happens if the last plaintext block is not completely full?

Message Padding


- What happens if the last plaintext block is not completely full?
- The message must be padded to a multiple of the cipher block size.

Message Padding

- What happens if the last plaintext block is not completely full?
- The message must be padded to a multiple of the cipher block size.
- One way to do this is to pad with 0:s and make the last byte be the number of bytes to remove from the last block:



• With this method you *have to* pad every message, even if it ends on a block boundary:



• With this method you *have to* pad every message, even if it ends on a block boundary:

 Another method called ciphertext stealing doesn't add any extra blocks.

CBC Mode

Cipher-Block Chaining

- In CBC mode, each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block and then encrypted. An initialization vector IV is used as a seed for encrypting the first block.
- Initialization:


$$C_0 \leftarrow \mathrm{IV}$$


Encryption:


$$C_i \leftarrow E_K(B_i \oplus C_{i-1})$$


• Decryption:

 $B_i \leftarrow D_K(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1}$









CBC Mode: Analysis

• Pros:

- Identical plaintext blocks will yield different ciphertext blocks.
- Decryption can be parallelized if all ciphertext blocks are available.
- If block C_i is lost, C_{i+1} can't be decrypted, but C_{i+2} can.
- Cons:
 - Encryption can't be parallelized.
- Most commonly used mode of operation.
- A one-bit change in a plaintext or IV affects all following ciphertext blocks.

CFB Mode

Cipher-FeedBack

- In CFB mode, the previous ciphertext block is encrypted and the output produced is combined with the plaintext block using XOR to produce the current ciphertext block.
- CFB can use feedback that is less than one full data block.
- An initialization vector *IV* is used as a seed for the first block.
- Initialization:


$$C_0 \leftarrow \mathrm{IV}$$


Encryption:


$$C_i \leftarrow E_K(C_{i-1}) \oplus B_i$$


Decryption:


 $B_i \leftarrow E_K(C_{i-1}) \oplus C_i$











CFB Mode: Analysis

Pros:

- CFB mode is self-synchronizing similar to CBC.
- Decryption can be parallelized.
- Decryptor is never used.
- Cons:
 - Encryption cannot be parallelized.
 - When decrypting, a one-bit change in the ciphertext corrupts the following 2 plaintext blocks.
 - When decrypting, a one-bit change in the plaintext block, corrupts 1 following plaintext block.

OFB Mode

Output-FeedBack Mode

- OFB mode is similar to CFB mode except that the quantity XORed with each plaintext block are vectors generated independently of both the plaintext and ciphertext.
- Stream cipher
- Initialization:

$$V_0 \gets \mathrm{IV}$$

Create vectors:

$$V_i \leftarrow E_K(V_{i-1});$$


• Encryption:


 $C_i \leftarrow V_i \oplus B_i;$


• Decryption:


 $B_i \leftarrow V_i \oplus C_i;$


Modes of Operations











OFB Mode: Analysis

- Pros:
 - Encryption and decryption can be done in parallel if the vectors have been precomputed.
 - If *i*:th ciphertext bit is flipped, the *i*:th plaintext bit is also flipped. This property helps with many error correcting codes.
- The keystream is plaintext independent.

CTR Mode

• Counter Mode

- CTR mode is similar to OFB: encryption is performed by XORing with a pad.
- Vectors are generated by encrypting seed + 0, seed + 1, seed + 1, ... given a random seed.
- Create vectors:


$$V_i \leftarrow E_K (\text{seed} + i - 1);$$


• Encryption:


$$C_i \leftarrow V_i \oplus B_i;$$


• Decryption:


$$B_i \leftarrow V_i \oplus C_i;$$





















CTR Mode: Analysis

- Pros:
 - Vector generation, encryption, decryption can be all be done in parallel.
 - We can recover from dropped blocks.
- Cons:
 - There are attacks (Hardware Fault Attack) that are based on the use of simple counter function.

Outline



Attacks on Block Ciphers

Attacks on Block Ciphers

Differential cryptanalysis: By careful analysis of the ciphertext of two related plaintexts encrypted under the same key, probabilities can be assigned to each of the possible keys, and eventually the most probable key is identified as the correct one.

Linear cryptanalysis: Use a linear approximation to describe the behavior of the block cipher. Given sufficient pairs of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext, bits of information about the key can be obtained.

Weak keys: Weak keys are secret keys with a certain value for which the block cipher in question will exhibit certain regularities in encryption or, in other cases, a poor level of encryption. For instance, with DES there are four keys for which encryption is exactly the same as decryption.

Outline

4 Modular Arithmetic Modular Inverses Modular Exponentiation Euler's Totient Function Euler's theorem Bezout's identity Modular Multiplicative Inverses Modular Exponentiation Primality Testing

Modular Arithmetic

- Block ciphers operate on blocks as large numbers.
- We can't deal with overflow: the output has to fit in the same size block as the input.
- We therefore perform arithmetic modulo n.
- After each arithmetic operation return the remainder after dividing by *n*.
- We're performing arithmetic in Z_n :

$$Z_n = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$$

Modular Arithmetic

• Addition, subtraction, multiplication are done by reducing the result to values in Z_n:

$$(a+b) \mod n = ((a \mod n) + (b \mod n)) \mod n$$
$$(a-b) \mod n = ((a \mod n) - (b \mod n)) \mod n$$
$$(a*b) \mod n = ((a \mod n) * (b \mod n)) \mod n$$

$$23 \equiv 11 \mod 12$$

$$23 \equiv 2 \mod 7$$

$$(10 + 13) \mod 7 = ((10 \mod 7) + (13 \mod 7)) \mod 7$$

$$= (3 + 6) \mod 7 = 2$$

Modular Arithmetic: Addition

• Addition table for Z_{10} , $(x + y) \mod 10$.

+	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
2	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
3	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2
4	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3
5	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4
6	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5
7	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
8	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

• y is the modular inverse of x, modulo n, if

 $xy \mod n = 1$

- Not every number in Z_n has an inverse.
- If *n* is prime then every number in Z_n has an inverse.
- Examples:
 - **1** $4 \cdot 3 \mod 11 = 12 \mod 11 = 1 \Rightarrow 4$ is the inverse of 3 in Z_{11} .

Modular Inverses. . .

- The inverse of 4 is $\frac{1}{4}$. Modular inverses are harder.
- To find the the inverse of 4 modulo 7 we want to compute:

$$4 * x = 1 \mod 7$$

which is the same as finding integers x and k such that

$$4x = 7k + 1$$

- This is also written: $4^{-1} = x \mod n$.
- Sometimes inverses exist, sometimes not:

$$5^{-1} = 3 \mod 14$$

 $2^{-1} = ? \mod 14$

Modular Inverses

- Multiplication table for Z_{10} , $xy \mod 10$.
- Elements that have a modular inverse have been highlighted.

×	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	0	2	4	6	8	0	2	4	6	8
3	0	3	6	9	2	5	8	1	4	7
4	0	4	8	2	6	0	4	8	2	6
5	0	5	0	5	0	5	0	5	0	5
6	0	6	2	8	4	0	6	2	8	4
7	0	7	4	1	8	5	2	9	6	3
8	0	8	6	4	2	0	8	6	4	2
9	0	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1

Modular Inverses

• Multiplication table for Z_{11} , $xy \mod 11$.

\times	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2	0	2	4	6	8	10	1	3	5	7	9
3	0	3	6	9	1	4	7	10	2	5	8
4	0	4	8	1	5	9	2	6	10	3	7
5	0	5	10	4	9	3	8	2	7	1	6
6	0	6	1	7	2	8	3	9	4	10	5
7	0	7	3	10	6	2	9	5	1	8	4
8	0	8	5	2	10	7	4	1	9	6	3
9	0	9	7	5	3	1	10	8	6	4	2
10	0	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1



• Create the modular multiplication table for Z_5 , $xy \mod 5$.

 Modular exponentiation is an important operation in cryptography:

$$x^y \mod n = \overbrace{x * x * \cdots * x}^y \mod n$$

• For which x and n do there exist modular powers equal to 1?

$$x^y \mod n \stackrel{?}{=} 1$$

- If *n* is prime then every non-zero element of Z_n has a power = 1.
- If *n* is not prime, only *x* for which GCD(x, n) = 1 (*x* and *n* are relatively prime) have a power = 1.
- Example: For Z_{13}^*

$$Z_n^* = \{x \in Z_n \text{ such that } \operatorname{GCD}(x, n) = 1\}$$

- Examples:
 - **1** $Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\}$

$$Z_n^* = \{x \in Z_n \text{ such that } \operatorname{GCD}(x, n) = 1\}$$

1
$$Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\}$$

2 $Z_{13}^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\}$

$$Z_n^* = \{x \in Z_n \text{ such that } \operatorname{GCD}(x, n) = 1\}$$

1
$$Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\}$$

2 $Z_{13}^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\}$

$$Z_n^* = \{x \in Z_n \text{ such that } \operatorname{GCD}(x, n) = 1\}$$

• Examples:

1
$$Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\}$$

2 $Z_{13}^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\}$

• In general, $Z_n^* = \{1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$ if n is prime

Modular Exponentiation...

- Modular exponentiation table for Z_{10} , $x^y \mod 10$.
- Elements in Z_n that have some power equal to 1 have been highlighted.

					у				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1 ^y	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2 ^y	2	4	8	6	2	4	8	6	2
3 ^y	3	9	7	1	3	9	7	1	3
4 ^y	4	6	4	6	4	6	4	6	4
5 ^y	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
6 ^y	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
7 ^y	7	9	3	1	7	9	3	1	7
8 ^y	8	4	2	6	8	4	2	6	8
9 <i>y</i>	9	1	9	1	9	1	9	1	9

Modular Exponentiation: Z_{13} , $x^y \mod 13$

		у										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 ^y	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2 ^y	2	4	8	3	6	12	11	9	5	10	7	1
3 <i>y</i>	3	9	1	3	9	1	3	9	1	3	9	1
4 <i>^y</i>	4	3	12	9	10	1	4	3	12	9	10	1
5 ^y	5	12	8	1	5	12	8	1	5	12	8	1
6 ^y	6	10	8	9	2	12	7	3	5	4	11	1
7 <i>y</i>	7	10	5	9	11	12	6	3	8	4	2	1
8 <i>y</i>	8	12	5	1	8	12	5	1	8	12	5	1
9 <i>y</i>	9	3	1	9	3	1	9	3	1	9	3	1
10 ^y	10	9	12	3	4	1	10	9	12	3	4	1
11 ^y	11	4	5	3	7	12	2	9	8	10	6	1
12 ^y	12	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	12	1

Modular Arithmetic

In-Class Exercise: Modular Exponentiation

• Create the modular exponentiation table for Z_5 , $x^y \mod 5$.

Outline

Modular Inverses Modular Exponentiation Sumber-Theoretic Theorems Euler's Totient Function Euler's theorem Bezout's identity Modular Multiplicative Inverses Modular Exponentiation Primality Testing

Number-Theoretic Theorems

$$\phi(n) = |Z_n^*|$$

• Examples:

1
$$Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\} \Rightarrow \phi(10) = 4$$

$$\phi(n) = |Z_n^*|$$

• Examples:

1
$$Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\} \Rightarrow \phi(10) = 4$$

2 $Z_{13}^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\} \Rightarrow \phi(13) = 12$

$$\phi(n) = |Z_n^*|$$

• Examples:

1
$$Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\} \Rightarrow \phi(10) = 4$$

2 $Z_{13}^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\} \Rightarrow \phi(13) = 12$

$$\phi(n) = |Z_n^*|$$

- Examples:
 - **1** $Z_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\} \Rightarrow \phi(10) = 4$ **2** $Z_{13}^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12\} \Rightarrow \phi(13) = 12$

• In general, if *n* is prime,

$$Z_n^* = \{1, 2, \ldots, n-1\} \Rightarrow \phi(n) = n-1.$$

Euler's Totient Function Values

n	$\phi(n)$	List of Divisors
1	1	1
2	1	1, 2
3	2	1, 3
4	2	1, 2, 4
5	4	1, 5
6	2	1, 2, 3, 6
7	6	1, 7
8	4	1, 2, 4, 8
9	6	1, 3, 9
10	4	1, 2, 5, 10
11	10	1, 11
12	4	1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12
13	12	1, 13
14	6	1, 2, 7, 14
15	8	1, 3, 5, 15
16	8	1, 2, 4, 8, 16
17	16	1, 17
18	6	1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 18

n	$\phi(n)$	List of Divisors
19	18	1, 19
20	8	1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 20
21	12	1, 3, 7, 21
22	10	1, 2, 11, 22
23	22	1, 23
24	8	1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 24
25	20	1, 5, 25
26	12	1, 2, 13, 26
27	18	1, 3, 9, 27
28	12	1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 28
29	28	1, 29
30	8	1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 15, 30
31	30	1, 31
32	16	1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32
33	20	1, 3, 11, 33
34	16	1, 2, 17, 34
35	24	1, 5, 7, 35
36	12	1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 18, 36

• You can calculate $\phi(n)$ as

$$\phi(n) = n(1-\frac{1}{p_1})\cdots(1-\frac{1}{p_m})$$

where p_1, \ldots, p_m are the the prime factors of n.

• Example:

()
$$\phi(35) = 35(1 - \frac{1}{5})(1 - \frac{1}{7}) = 35 \cdot \frac{4}{5} \cdot \frac{6}{7} = 24$$



• What's $\phi(37)$?

In-Class Exercise

- What's $\phi(37)$?
- **2** What's $\phi(38)$?

Euler's Theorem

- $\phi(n)$ is the number of positive integers relatively prime with n.
- If p is prime, $\phi(p) = p 1$.
- If n = pq is the product of two primes p and q, then $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$.

Theorem (Euler)

Let x be any positive integer that's relatively prime to the integer n > 0, then

 $x^{\phi(n)} \mod n = 1$

Number-Theoretic Theorems

• Euler's theorem holds for each element x of Z_n^* :

 $x^{\phi(n)} \mod n = 1$

- Examples:
 - $7^{\phi(10)} \mod 10 \equiv 7^4 \mod 10 = 1$ since GCD(7, 10) = 1 and $7 \in Z_{10}^*$:

 $7^4 \bmod 10 \equiv 2401 \bmod 10 = 1$

Theorem (Corollary to Euler's theorem)

Let x be any positive integer that's relatively prime to the integer n > 0, and let k be any positive integer, then

$$x^k \mod n = x^k \mod \phi(n) \mod n$$

• Euler's theorem allows us to reduce the exponent modulo $\phi(n)$:

$$x^y \mod n = x^y \mod \phi(n) \mod n$$

• Examples:

1
$$7^{27} \mod 13 \equiv 7^{27 \mod \phi(13)} \mod 13 \equiv 7^{27 \mod 12} \mod 13 \equiv 7^3 \mod 13 = 5$$

Number-Theoretic Theorems

In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia R-8.17

• What's $\phi(143)$?

In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia R-8.17

- **1** What's $\phi(143)$?
- What's 7¹²⁰ mod 143?

In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia C-8.8

• What are the prime factors of 10403?

In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia C-8.8

What are the prime factors of 10403?

2 What's $\phi(10403)$?

In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia C-8.8

- What are the prime factors of 10403?
- **2** What's $\phi(10403)$?
- \bigcirc Use Euler's theorem to compute 20¹⁰²⁰³ mod 10403.

Theorem (Corollary to Euler's theorem)

Given two prime numbers p and q, integers n = pq and 0 < m < n, and an arbitrary integer k, then

$$m^{k\phi(n)+1} \mod n = m^{k(p-1)(q-1)+1} \mod n = m \mod n$$

• This relationship will be useful in the proof of correctness of the RSA algorithm.

Theorem (Fermat's Little)

Let p be a prime number and g any positive integer g < p, then

$$g^{p-1} \mod p = 1$$

• Euler's theorem is a generalization of Fermat's little theorem.

• Examples:

 $\textcircled{1} 10^{13-1} \bmod 13 = 10^{12} \bmod 13 = 1$

Outline

Modular Inverses Modular Exponentiation Euler's Totient Function Euler's theorem 6 Number-Theoretic Algorithms Bezout's identity Modular Multiplicative Inverses Modular Exponentiation Primality Testing

Number-Theoretic Algorithms

• GCD(a, b) is the largest number d that divides a and b evenly.

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- GCD(a, b) is the largest number d that divides a and b evenly.
- Euler's algorithm GCD(a, b) returns a triple (d, i, j).
- Based on the observation that if x divided a and b, it also divides a - b. We need to find the largest such x.
- Key observation: If

$$d = \operatorname{GCD}(a, b)$$
 and $b > 0$

then

$$d = \operatorname{GCD}(b, a \bmod b)$$

function
$$gcd(int a, int b)$$
 : $(int, int, int) =$
if $b = 0$ then
return $(a, 1, 0)$
 $q \leftarrow \lfloor a/b \rfloor$
 $(d, k, l) \leftarrow gcd(b, a \mod b)$
return $(d, l, k - lq)$

• Example:

 $GCD(546, 198) = GCD(198, 546 \mod 198) = GCD(198, 150)$

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 $GCD(546, 198) = GCD(198, 546 \mod 198) = GCD(198, 150)$ = $GCD(150, 198 \mod 150) = GCD(150, 48)$

• Example:

 $GCD(546, 198) = GCD(198, 546 \mod 198) = GCD(198, 150)$

- $= \operatorname{GCD}(150, 198 \mod 150) = \operatorname{GCD}(150, 48)$
- $= \operatorname{GCD}(48, 150 \mod 48) = \operatorname{GCD}(48, 6)$

• Example:

 $GCD(546, 198) = GCD(198, 546 \mod 198) = GCD(198, 150)$

- $= \operatorname{GCD}(150, 198 \mod 150) = \operatorname{GCD}(150, 48)$
- $= \operatorname{GCD}(48, 150 \mod 48) = \operatorname{GCD}(48, 6)$
- $= \operatorname{GCD}(6, 48 \mod 6) = \operatorname{GCD}(6, 0)$

• Example:

 $GCD(546, 198) = GCD(198, 546 \mod 198) = GCD(198, 150)$

- $= \operatorname{GCD}(150, 198 \mod 150) = \operatorname{GCD}(150, 48)$
- $= \operatorname{GCD}(48, 150 \mod 48) = \operatorname{GCD}(48, 6)$
- $= \operatorname{GCD}(6, 48 \mod 6) = \operatorname{GCD}(6, 0)$

= 6

• Compute GCD by hand:

- divide the larger one by the smaller;
- Write an equation of the form

 $larger = smaller \times quotient + remainder;$



- **③** repeat using the two numbers smaller and remainder;
- When you get a 0 remainder, the previous line will be the gcd of the original two numbers.

• Find GCD(421, 111).

 $421 \hspace{.1in} = \hspace{.1in} 111 \times 3 + 88$

• Find GCD(421, 111).

 $\begin{array}{rrrr} 421 & = & 111 \times 3 + 88 \\ 111 & = & 88 \times 1 + 23 \end{array}$

- $421 \ = \ 111 \times 3 + 88$
- $111 \hspace{.1in} = \hspace{.1in} 88 \times 1 + 23$
 - $88 = 23 \times 3 + 19$

- $421 \ = \ 111 \times 3 + 88$
- $111 = 88 \times 1 + 23$
 - $88 \hspace{.1in} = \hspace{.1in} 23 \times 3 + 19$
 - $23 \hspace{.1in} = \hspace{.1in} 19 \times 1 + 4$

- $421 \ = \ 111 \times 3 + 88$
- $111 = 88 \times 1 + 23$
 - $88 \hspace{0.2cm} = \hspace{0.2cm} 23 \times 3 + 19$
 - $23 \hspace{.1in} = \hspace{.1in} 19 \times 1 + 4$
 - $19 = 4 \times 4 + 3$

- $421 = 111 \times 3 + 88$
- $111 = 88 \times 1 + 23$
- $88 = 23 \times 3 + 19$
- $23 \hspace{.1in} = \hspace{.1in} 19 \times 1 + 4$
- $\begin{array}{rcl}
 19 & = & 4 \times 4 + 3 \\
 4 & = & 3 \times 1 + 1
 \end{array}$

• Find GCD(421, 111).

 $421 = 111 \times 3 + 88$ $111 = 88 \times 1 + 23$ $88 = 23 \times 3 + 19$ $23 = 19 \times 1 + 4$ $19 = 4 \times 4 + 3$ $4 = 3 \times 1 + 1$ $3 = 1 \times 3 + 0$

• The last non-zero remainder is $1 \Rightarrow \text{GCD}(421, 111) = 1$.

Number-Theoretic Algorithms



• Compute GCD(196, 42). Show your work.

Theorem (Bezout's identity)

Given any integers a and b, not both zero, there exist integers i and j such that GCD(a, b) = ia + jb.

• Example:

$$GCD(819, 462) = (-9) \times 819 + 16 \times 462 = 21.$$

• We use the **Extended GCD Algorithm** to compute *i* and *j*.

- Start by finding GCD(819, 462) = 21:
 - $0: \ 819 \ = \ 462 \times 1 + 357$

- Start by finding GCD(819, 462) = 21:

• Start by finding GCD(819, 462) = 21:

0:	819	=	$462 \times 1 + 357$
1:	462	=	$357 \times 1 + 105$
2 :	357	=	105 imes 3 + 42
3 :	105	=	42 imes 2 + 21
4:	42	=	$21 \times 2 + 0$

Now work backwards, substituting one equation into the previous one.



	Step 3:	
3 :	105	$=$ 42 \times 2 + 21
3 <i>a</i> :	1 imes 105+(-2) imes 42	= 21

	Step 3:	
3 :	105	$= 42 \times 2 + 21$
3 <i>a</i> :	1 imes105+(-2) imes42	= 21

	:	Step 2:		
2 :	357		=	105 imes 3 + 42

	Step 3:	
3 :	105	$=$ 42 \times 2 + 21
3a :	1 imes105+(-2) imes42	= 21

	Step 2:		
2 :	357	=	105 imes 3 + 42
2a :	357 + (-3) imes 105	=	42

	Step 3:	
3 :	105	$= 42 \times 2 + 21$
3 <i>a</i> :	1 imes105+(-2) imes42	= 21

	Step 2:		
2 :	357	=	105 imes 3 + 42
2a :	357 + (-3) imes 105	=	42
2b[2a imes(-2)]	$(-2) \times 357 + (-2)(-3) \times 105$	=	$(-2) \times 42$

	Step 3:		
3 :	105	=	$42 \times 2 + 21$
3a :	1 imes 105+(-2) imes 42	=	21

	Step 2:		
2 :	357	=	105 imes 3 + 42
2a :	357 + (-3) imes 105	=	42
2b[2a imes(-2)]	$(-2) \times 357 + (-2)(-3) \times 105$	=	$(-2) \times 42$
2 <i>c</i> [2 <i>b</i> in 3 <i>a</i>] :	(-2) imes 357 + (-2)(-3) imes 105	=	21-1 imes105

	Step 3:	
3 :	105	$= 42 \times 2 + 21$
3 <i>a</i> :	1 imes105+(-2) imes42	= 21

	Step 2:		
2 :	357	=	105 imes 3 + 42
2a :	357 + (-3) imes 105	=	42
2b[2a imes(-2)]	$(-2) \times 357 + (-2)(-3) \times 105$	=	$(-2) \times 42$
2 <i>c</i> [2 <i>b</i> in 3 <i>a</i>] :	$(-2) \times 357 + (-2)(-3) \times 105$	=	21-1 imes105
2 <i>d</i> [simplify 2 <i>c</i>] :	(-2) imes 357+7 imes 105	=	21

	Step 3:	
3 :	105	$= 42 \times 2 + 21$
3 <i>a</i> :	1 imes105+(-2) imes42	= 21

	Step 2:		
2 :	357	=	105 imes 3 + 42
2a :	357 + (-3) imes 105	=	42
2b[2a imes(-2)]	$(-2) \times 357 + (-2)(-3) \times 105$	=	$(-2) \times 42$
2 <i>c</i> [2 <i>b</i> in 3 <i>a</i>] :	$(-2) \times 357 + (-2)(-3) \times 105$	=	21-1 imes105
2 <i>d</i> [simplify 2 <i>c</i>] :	(-2) imes 357+7 imes 105	=	21

		Step 1:	
1:	462		$= 357 \times 1 + 105$

	Step 1:	
1:	462	=357 $ imes$ 1 $+$ 105
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105

	Step 1:	
1:	462	=357 imes 1 + 105
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	$=7 \times 105$

	Step 1:	
1:	462	$= 357 \times 1 + 105$
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	$=7 \times 105$
1c[1b in 2d] :	$(-2) \times 357 + 7 \times 462 + (7)(-1) \times 357$	=21

Step 1:			
1:	462	$= 357 \times 1 + 105$	
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105	
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	$=7 \times 105$	
1 <i>c</i> [1 <i>b</i> in 2 <i>d</i>] :	$(-2) \times 357 + 7 \times 462 + (7)(-1) \times 357$	=21	
1d[simplify 1c] :	(-9) imes 357 + 7 imes 462	=21	

	Step 1:	
1:	462	$=357 \times 1 + 105$
1a :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	$=7 \times 105$
1 <i>c</i> [1 <i>b</i> in 2 <i>d</i>] :	$(-2) \times 357 + 7 \times 462 + (7)(-1) \times 357$	=21
1d[simplify 1c] :	$(-9) \times 357 + 7 \times 462$	=21
	Step 0:	
0:	819	$=462 \times 1 + 357$

Step 1:			
1:	462	$=357 \times 1 + 105$	
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105	
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	=7 imes 105	
1c[1b in 2d] :	$(-2) \times 357 + 7 \times 462 + (7)(-1) \times 357$	=21	
1d[simplify 1c] :	(-9) imes 357 + 7 imes 462	=21	

	Step 0:	
0:	819	$=462 \times 1 + 357$
0 <i>a</i> :	819+(-1) imes 462	=357

Step 1:			
1:	462	$= 357 \times 1 + 105$	
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105	
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	=7 imes 105	
1 <i>c</i> [1 <i>b</i> in 2 <i>d</i>] :	$(-2) \times 357 + 7 \times 462 + (7)(-1) \times 357$	=21	
1d[simplify 1c] :	(-9) imes 357+7 imes 462	=21	

	Step 0:	
0:	819	$=462 \times 1 + 357$
0 <i>a</i> :	819 + (-1) imes 462	=357
0b[0a imes(-9)]:	(-9) imes 819 + (-9)(-1) imes 462	$=(-9) \times 357$

Step 1:			
1:	462	$= 357 \times 1 + 105$	
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105	
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	$=7 \times 105$	
1 <i>c</i> [1 <i>b</i> in 2 <i>d</i>] :	$(-2) \times 357 + 7 \times 462 + (7)(-1) \times 357$	=21	
1d[simplify 1c] :	(-9) imes 357+7 imes 462	=21	

<u><u> </u></u>		\sim
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0:	819	$=462 \times 1 + 357$
0 <i>a</i> :	819 + (-1) imes 462	=357
0b[0a imes(-9)]:	(-9) imes 819 + (-9)(-1) imes 462	$=(-9) \times 357$
0 <i>c</i> [0 <i>b</i> in 1 <i>d</i>] :	$(-9) \times 819 + (-9)(-1) \times 462 + 7 \times 46$	2=21

Step 1:			
1:	462	$= 357 \times 1 + 105$	
1 <i>a</i> :	462 + (-1) imes 357	=105	
1b[1a imes 7] :	7 imes 462+7(-1) imes 357	$=7 \times 105$	
1 <i>c</i> [1 <i>b</i> in 2 <i>d</i>] :	$(-2) \times 357 + 7 \times 462 + (7)(-1) \times 357$	=21	
1d[simplify 1c] :	(-9) imes 357+7 imes 462	=21	

-

<u> </u>		\sim
Ste	n	
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	I	
0:	819	$=462 \times 1 + 357$
0 <i>a</i> :	819 + (-1) imes 462	=357
0b[0a imes(-9)]:	(-9) imes 819 + (-9)(-1) imes 462	$=(-9) \times 357$
0 <i>c</i> [0 <i>b</i> in 1 <i>d</i>] :	$(-9) \times 819 + (-9)(-1) \times 462 + 7 \times 46$	2=21
0 <i>d</i> [simplify 0 <i>c</i>] :	(-9) imes 819+16 imes 462	=21

• Compute *i* and *j* such that at

$GCD(196, 42) = i \times 196 + j \times 42.$

Show your work.

• We can use the GCD routine to compute modular multiplicative inverses.

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such that

$$1 = ix + jn$$

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such that

$$1 = ix + jn$$

Then

$$(ix + jn) \mod n = ix \mod n = 1$$

and *i* is x's multiplicative inverse in Z_n . • If $GCD(n, x) \neq 1$ then we know that the inverse doesn't exist.

 Modular exponentiation is an important operation in cryptography.

$$g^n \mod p = \overbrace{g * g * \cdots * g}^n \mod p$$

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$$g^{2} = g \cdot g$$
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$$g'' = g \cdot g$$
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$$g'' = g^2 \cdot g^2$$
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We can then use these powers to compute gⁿ:

$$g^{25} = g^{16+8+1} = g^{16} \cdot g^8 \cdot g^1$$

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• We can then use these powers to compute g^n :

$$egin{array}{rcl} g^{25} &=& g^{16+8+1} = g^{16} \cdot g^8 \cdot g^1 \ g^{46} &=& g^{32+8+4+2} = g^{32} \cdot g^8 \cdot g^4 \cdot g^2 \end{array}$$

• Compute $g^n \mod p$:

```
function modexp(int g, int n, int p)

int q \leftarrow 1

int m \leftarrow n

int square \leftarrow g

while m \ge 1 do

if odd(m) then

g \leftarrow q \cdot square \mod p

square \leftarrow square \cdot square \mod p

m \leftarrow \lfloor m/2 \rfloor
```

Primality Testing

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- We are given an integer *n* and want to test if it's prime or not.
- There exists efficient methods for primality testing.
- The number of primes between 1 and n is at least $n/\ln(n)$, for $n \ge 4$.
- To generate a prime number q between n/2 and n:
 - **1** Let $q \leftarrow$ a random number between n/2 and n;

- We are given an integer *n* and want to test if it's prime or not.
- There exists efficient methods for primality testing.
- The number of primes between 1 and n is at least n/ln(n), for n ≥ 4.
- To generate a prime number q between n/2 and n:
 - 1 Let $q \leftarrow$ a random number between n/2 and n;
 - 2 q is prime with a probability of at least $1/\ln(n)$;

- We are given an integer *n* and want to test if it's prime or not.
- There exists efficient methods for primality testing.
- The number of primes between 1 and n is at least $n/\ln(n)$, for $n \ge 4$.
- To generate a prime number q between n/2 and n:
 - 1 Let $q \leftarrow$ a random number between n/2 and n;
 - 2 q is prime with a probability of at least $1/\ln(n)$;
 - 3 If isPrime(q) then return q;

- We are given an integer *n* and want to test if it's prime or not.
- There exists efficient methods for primality testing.
- The number of primes between 1 and n is at least $n/\ln(n)$, for $n \ge 4$.
- To generate a prime number q between n/2 and n:
 - 1 Let $q \leftarrow$ a random number between n/2 and n;
 - 2 q is prime with a probability of at least $1/\ln(n)$;
 - 3 If $\operatorname{isPrime}(q)$ then return q;
 - Repeat from 1.

In-Class Exercise: Goodrich & Tamassia R-8.16

• Roughly how many times would you have to call a primality tester to find a prime number between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000?

Outline

- Introduction
- Modes of Operations
- 3) Attacks on Block Ciphers
- 4 Modular Arithmetic
 - Modular Inverses
 - Modular Exponentiation
- 5 Number-Theoretic Theorems
 - Euler's Totient Function
 - Euler's theorem
- 6 Number-Theoretic Algorithms
 - Bezout's identity
 - Modular Multiplicative Inverses
 - Modular Exponentiation
 - Primality Testing



Euler's Theorem

Theorem (Euler)

Let x be any positive integer that's relatively prime to the integer n > 0, then

 $x^{\phi(n)} \mod n = 1$

• Now consider (where *a* and *n* are relatively prime)

 $a^m \mod n = 1.$

We know, by Euler's theorem, that there's at least one number *m* that satisfies this equation: $\phi(n)$!

- The smallest positive *m* for which the equation holds is called
 - the order of *a* mod *n*
 - the length of the period generated by a.

• Consider the powers of 7, mod 19:

7^1	=	7 mod 19
7 ²	=	11 mod 19
7 ³	=	1 mod 19
7 ⁴	=	7 mod 19
7 ⁵	=	11 mod 19
7 ⁶	=	1 mod 19

• The sequence repeats.

Powers of Integers, Modulo 19

- All the powers of *a*, modulo 19.
- The length of the sequence is highlighted.

a^1	a ²	a ³	a ⁴	a ⁵	a ⁶	a ⁷	a ⁸	a ⁹	a^{10}	a ¹¹	a ¹²	a ¹³	a ¹⁴	a ¹⁵	a ¹⁶	a ¹⁷	a ¹⁸
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	4	8	16	13	7	14	9	18	17	15	11	3	6	12	5	10	1
3	9	8	5	15	7	2	6	18	16	10	11	14	4	12	17	13	1
4	16	7	9	17	11	6	5	1	4	16	7	9	17	11	6	5	1
5	6	11	17	9	7	16	4	1	5	6	11	17	9	7	16	4	1
6	17	7	4	5	11	9	16	1	6	17	7	4	5	11	9	16	1
7	11	1	7	11	1	7	11	1	7	11	1	7	11	1	7	11	1
8	7	18	11	12	1	8	7	18	11	12	1	8	7	18	11	12	1
9	5	7	6	16	11	4	17	1	9	5	7	6	16	11	4	17	1
10	5	12	6	3	11	15	17	18	9	14	7	13	16	8	4	2	1
11	7	1	11	7	1	11	7	1	11	7	1	11	7	1	11	7	1
12	11	18	7	8	1	12	11	18	7	8	1	12	11	18	7	8	1
13	17	12	4	14	11	10	16	18	6	2	7	15	5	8	9	3	1
14	6	8	17	10	7	3	4	18	5	13	11	2	9	12	16	15	1
15	16	12	9	2	11	13	5	18	4	3	7	10	17	8	6	14	1
16	9	11	5	4	7	17	6	1	16	9	11	5	4	7	17	6	1
17	4	11	16	6	7	5	9	1	17	4	11	16	6	7	5	9	1
18	1	18	1	18	1	18	1	18	1	18	1	18	1	18	1	18	1

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$$a, a^2, \ldots, a^{\phi(n)}$$

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- All sequences end with 1.
- Some sequences have length 18. Then we say
 - a generates the set of nonzero integers, modulo 19.
 - a is a primitive root of the modulus 19.
- If *a* is a primitive root of *n* then all its powers

$$a, a^2, \ldots, a^{\phi(n)}$$

are distinct.

• If a is a primitive root of p, and p is prime, then

$$a, a^2, \ldots, a^p$$

are distinct mod p.

Discrete Logarithms

• The only integers with primitive roots are of the form (p prime, $\alpha > 0$)

 $2, 4, p^{\alpha}, 2p^{\alpha}$

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• For 19 (a prime), the primitive roots are 2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 15.

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$$2, 4, p^{lpha}, 2p^{lpha}$$

- For 19 (a prime), the primitive roots are 2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 15.
- g is a primitive root modulo p if, for each integer i in Z_p, there exists an integer k such that

$$i = g^k \mod p.$$

• For example, looking at the table above, we see that 2 is a primitive root modulo 19:

 21
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26
 27
 28
 29
 2¹⁰
 2¹¹
 2¹²
 2¹³
 2¹⁴
 2¹⁵
 2¹⁶
 2¹⁷
 2¹⁸

 2
 4
 8
 16
 13
 7
 14
 9
 18
 17
 15
 11
 3
 6
 12
 5
 10
 1

because for each integer $i \in Z_{19} = \{1, 2, 3, ..., 18\}$ there's an integer k, such that $i = 2^k \mod 19$.

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because for each integer $i \in Z_{19} = \{1, 2, 3, ..., 18\}$ there's an integer k, such that $i = 2^k \mod 19$.

• There are $\phi(p-1)$ generators for Z_p .

In-Class Exercise

- Compute the table of powers of *a*, modulo 5, for all positive integers *a* < 5.</p>
- What are the primitive roots of 5?

In-Class Exercise

- Compute the table of powers of *a*, modulo 7, for all positive integers *a* < 7.</p>
- What are the primitive roots of 7?

• Consider the equation

$$y = g^x \mod p$$

If we have g, x, and p it's easy to calculate y.

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• Consider the equation

$$y = g^x \mod p$$

If we have g, x, and p it's easy to calculate y.

• What if, instead, we're given y, g, and p?

• it's hard to take the discrete logarithm, i.e. to compute x.

• The fastest known algorithm is

$$\mathcal{O}(e^{((\ln p)^{1/3}(\ln(\ln p))^{2/3})})$$

which is infeasible for large primes *p*.

Outline

- Introduction
- Modes of Operations
- 3) Attacks on Block Ciphers
- 4 Modular Arithmetic
 - Modular Inverses
 - Modular Exponentiation
- 5 Number-Theoretic Theorems
 - Euler's Totient Function
 - Euler's theorem
- 6 Number-Theoretic Algorithms
 - Bezout's identity
 - Modular Multiplicative Inverses
 - Modular Exponentiation
 - Primality Testing
 - Discrete Logarithms



Readings and References

• Chapter 8.1.7, 8.2.1, 8.5.2 in *Introduction to Computer Security*, by Goodrich and Tamassia.

Additional material and exercises have also been collected from these sources:

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- **2** William Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security.
- S Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography.
- In the second second

http://amadousarr.free.fr/java/javacryptobook.pdf.

- Euler's Totient Function Values For n = 1 to 500, with Divisor Lists, http://primefan.tripod.com/Phi500.html
- **o** Diffie-Hellman calculator:

http://dkerr.home.mindspring.com/diffie_hellman_calc.html.