

Software Protection: How to Crack Programs, and Defend Against Cracking

Lecture 2: Attack Models

Minsk, Belarus, Spring 2014

Christian Collberg
University of Arizona

www.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg

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7. Give an example of a tamperproofing algorithm!

When? Where? Why?

1. We now meet Wednesday 18:30
2. We meet in Auditorium П-13 (1st floor)
3. Please check the website for important announcements:

`www.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg/`

`Teaching/bsuir/2014`

Today's lecture

1. Attack models
2. Constructing attack trees
3. Cracking binaries

Models

Models

- To build secure systems, we need sound models.
- Which security properties should be assured?
- What type of attacks can be launched?

Principle of Easiest Penetration

Definition (Principle of Easiest Penetration)

An adversary must be expected to use any available means of penetration — not the most obvious means, and not against the part of the system that has been best defended.

- The attacker will not behave the way we want him to behave.

Attack Trees

- We need to model threats against computer systems.
- What are the different ways in which a system can be attacked?
- If we can understand this, we can design proper countermeasures.
- Attack trees are a way to methodically describe the security of a system.

Structure of Attack Trees

- The root node is the overall goal the attacker wants to achieve.
- Attack trees have both AND and OR nodes:

  OR: Alternatives to achieving a goal.

  AND: Different steps toward achieving a goal.
- Each node is a subgoal.
- Child nodes are ways to achieve a subgoal.

Example I — Open a Safe



Example I — Open a Safe

- Examine the safe/safe owner/attacker's abilities/etc. and assign values to the nodes:
  - P = Possible
  - I = Impossible
- The value of an OR node is possible if any of its children are possible.
- The value of an AND node is possible if all children are possible.
- A path of P:s from a leaf to the root is a possible attack!
- Once you know the possible attacks, you can think of ways to defend against them!

Example I — Open a Safe



Example I — Open a Safe

- We can be more specfic and model the cost of an attack.
- Costs propagate up the tree:

  OR nodes: take the min of the children.
  AND nodes: take the sum the children.

Example I — Open a Safe



Example II — Read a Message

Goal: Read a message sent from computer A to B.

1. Convince sender to reveal message
    1. Bribe user, OR
    2. Blackmail user, OR
    3. Threaten user, OR
    4. Fool user.

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2. Read message while it is being entered
    1. Monitor electromagnetic radiation, OR
    2. Visually monitor computer screen.

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3. Read message while stored on A's disk.
    1. Get access to hard drive, AND
    2. Read encrypted file.

Example II — Read a Message

4. Read message while being sent from A to B.
    1. Intercept message in transit, AND
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4. Read message while being sent from A to B.
    1. Intercept message in transit, AND
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5. Convince recipient to reveal message
    1. Bribe user, OR
    2. Blackmail user, OR
    3. Threaten user, OR
    4. Fool user.

Example II — Read a Message

4. Read message while being sent from A to B.
    1. Intercept message in transit, AND
    2. Read encrypted message.
5. Convince recipient to reveal message
    1. Bribe user, OR
    2. Blackmail user, OR
    3. Threaten user, OR
    4. Fool user.
6. Read message while it is being read
    1. Monitor electromagnetic radiation, OR
    2. Visually monitor computer screen.

Example II — Read a Message

7. Read message when being stored on B's disk.
   1. Get stored message from B's disk after decryption
      1. Get access to disk, AND
      2. Read encrypted file.

      OR
   2. Get stored message from backup tapes after decryption.

Example II — Read a Message

7. Read message when being stored on B's disk.
   1. Get stored message from B's disk after decryption
      1. Get access to disk, AND
      2. Read encrypted file.

      OR
   2. Get stored message from backup tapes after decryption.
8. Get paper printout of message
   1. Get physical access to safe, AND
   2. Open the safe.

In-class Exercise: Attack Trees

- Alice wants to make sure that Bob cannot log into any account on the Unix machine she is administering.
- Alice draws an attack tree to see what Bob's attack options are.
- Show the tree!
- Source: Michael S. Pallos,

  `http://www.bizforum.org/whitepapers/candle-4.htm`.

In-class Exercise II

- Every night, Alice, 16, sits down with her laptop in front of the TV in the living room and adds a paragraph to her diary, describing her latest dating adventures.
- Bob, her 13-year-old bratty brother, would love to get his grubby hands on her writings.
- Help Bob plan an attack (or Alice to defend herself against an attack!) by constructing a *detailed* attack tree!

In-class Exercise II. . .

Bob knows this about Alice:

1. She writes and stores her diary directly on her laptop.
2. The hard drive is encrypted with 512-bit AES.
3. She's written down her pass-phrase on a post-it note.
4. She stores the post-it note in a safe in her bedroom.

In-class Exercise II. . .

1. The safe is locked with a 5-pin pin-and-tumbler lock.
2. She carries the key to the safe on a chain around her neck wherever she goes.
3. She leaves the laptop next to her bed at night.
4. The laptop is always connected to the Internet over wifi.

In-class Exercise II. . .

We know the following about Bob:

1. He can roam freely around the house.
2. His paper-route has given him the financial means to purchase various attack tools off the Internet.

In-class Exercise II. . .

- Your solution should consider both physical attacks and cyber attacks.
- I will only give you credit for attacks and concepts we have discussed in class!
- You don't have to assign costs to the nodes of the tree.
- Make sure to mark **AND** and **OR** nodes unambiguously.
- You can draw the actual tree or, if you prefer, represent the tree with indented, nested, numbered lists.

Attack Targets

Who's our adversary?

- What does a typical program look like?

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- What does a typical program look like?
- What valuables does the program contain?
- What is the adversary's motivation for attacking your program?
- What information does he start out with as he attacks your program?

Who's our adversary. . . ?

- What is his overall strategy for reaching his goals?

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- What tools does he have to his disposal?

Who's our adversary. . . ?

- What is his overall strategy for reaching his goals?
- What tools does he have to his disposal?
- What specific techniques does he use to attack the program?

Example Program



Example Program

```
1 typedef unsigned int uint;
2 typedef uint* waddr_t;
3 uint player_key = 0xbabeca75;
4 uint the_key;
5 uint* key = &the_key;
6 FILE* audio;
7 int activation_code = 42;
```

Example Program

```
 7  void FIRST_FUN(){}
 8  uint hash (waddr_t addr, waddr_t last) {
 9      uint h = *addr;
10      for(;addr<=last;addr++) h^=*addr;
11      return h;
12  }
13  void die(char* msg) {
14      fprintf(stderr,"%s!\n",msg);
15      key = NULL;
16  }
```

Example Program

```
19 uint play(uint user_key,
20            uint encrypted_media[],
21            int media_len) {
22   int code;
23   printf("Please enter activation code: ");
24   scanf("%i",&code);
25   if (code!=activation_code) die("wrong code");
26
27   *key = user_key ^ player_key;
```

Example Program

```
27      int i;
28      for(i=0;i<media_len;i++) {
29          uint decrypted = *key ^ encrypted_media[i];
30          asm volatile (
31              "jmp L1                     \n\t"
32              ".align 4                   \n\t"
33              ".long      0xb0b5b0b5\n\t"
34              "L1:                        \n\t"
35          );
36          if (time(0) > 1221011472) die("expired");
37          float decoded = (float)decrypted;
38          fprintf(audio,"%f\n",decoded); fflush(audio);
39      }
40  }
```

Example Program

```
41 void LAST_FUN(){}
42 uint player_main (uint argc, char *argv[]) {
43     uint user_key = ···
44     uint encrypted_media[100] = ···
45     uint media_len = ···
46     uint hashVal = hash((waddr_t)FIRST_FUN,
47                         (waddr_t)LAST_FUN);
48     if (hashVal != HASH) die("tampered");
49     play(user_key, encrypted_media,media_len);
50 }
```

What's the Adversary's Motivation?

The adversary's wants to

- remove the protection semantics.



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- add his own attack semantics (ability to save game-state, print,...)



What's the Adversary's Motivation?

The adversary's wants to

- remove the protection semantics.
- add his own attack semantics (ability to save game-state, print,...)
- ensure that the core semantics remains unchanged.



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  - remove use-before check
  - remove activation code

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- use the program after the expiration date
  - remove use-before check
  - remove activation code
- distribute the program to other users
  - remove fingerprint `0xb0b5b0b5`
- reverse engineer the algorithms in the player

What are the methods of attack?

1. the *black box* phase
   - feed the program inputs,
   - record its outputs,
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   - feed the program inputs,
   - record its outputs,
   - draw conclusions about its behavior.
2. the *dynamic analysis* phase
   - execute the program
   - record which parts get executed for different inputs.
3. the *static analysis* phase
   - examining the executable code directly
   - use disassembler, decompiler, ...

What are the methods of attack?

4. the *editing* phase
   - use understanding of the internals of the program
   - modify the executable
   - disable license checks

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4. the *editing* phase
   - use understanding of the internals of the program
   - modify the executable
   - disable license checks
5. the *automation* phase.
   - encapsulates his knowledge of the attack in an automated *script*
   - use in future attacks.

Cracking with gdb

Learning the executable (Linux)

1. Print dynamic symbols:

```
> objdump -T player2
```

2. Disassemble:

```
> objdump -d player2 | head
```

3. Start address:

```
> objdump -f player2 | grep start
```

4. Address and size of segments:

```
> objdump -x player2 | egrep 'rodata|text|Name'
```

Learning the executable (Mac OS X)

1. Print dynamic symbols:

```
> objdump -T player2
```

2. Disassemble:

```
> otool -t -v player2
```

3. Start address:

```
> otool -t -v player2 | head
```

4. Address and size of segments:

```
otool -l player2 | gawk '/__text/,/size/{print}'
otool -l player2 | gawk '/__cstring/,/size/{print}'
```

Learning the executable

1. Find strings in the program:

```
> strings player2
```

2. The strings and their offsets:

```
> strings -o player2
```

3. The bytes of the executable:

```
> od -a player2
```

Tracing the executable

1. `ltrace` traces library calls:

```
> ltrace -i -e printf player2
```

2. `strace` traces system calls:

```
> strace -i -e write player2
```

3. On Mac OS X:

```
   sudo dtruss player1
```

Debugging with gdb

1. To start `gdb`:

```
gdb -write -silent --args player2 0xca7ca115 1000
```

2. Search for a string in an executable:

```
(gdb) find startaddress, +length, "string"
(gdb) find startaddress, stopaddress, "string"
```

Debugging with gdb

1. Breakpoints:

```
(gdb) break *0x......
(gdb) hbreak *0x......
```

`hbreak` sets a hardware breakpoint which doesn't modify the executable itself.

2. Watchpoints:

```
(gdb) rwatch *0x......
(gdb) awatch *0x......
```

Debugging with gdb...

1. To disassemble instructions:

```
(gdb) disass startaddress endaddress
(gdb) x/3i address
(gdb) x/i $pc
```

2. To examine data (`x=hex`,s=string, d=decimal, `b=byte`,...):

```
(gdb) x/x address
(gdb) x/s address
(gdb) x/d address
(gdb) x/b address
```

3. Print register values:

```
(gdb) info registers
```

Debugging with gdb. . .

1. Examine the callstack:

```
(gdb) where
(gdb) bt          -- same as where
(gdb) up          -- previous frame
(gdb) down        -- next frame
```

2. Step one instruction at a time:

```
(gdb) display/i $pc
(gdb) stepi     -- step one instruction
(gdb) nexti     -- step over function calls
```

3. Modify a value in memory:

```
(gdb) set {unsigned char}address = value
(gdb) set {int}address = value
```

Patching executables with gdb

Cracking an executable proceedes in these steps:

1. find the right address in the executable,
2. find what the new instruction should be,
3. modify the instruction in memory,
4. save the changes to the executable file.

Start the program to allow patching:

```
> gdb -write -q player1
```

Make the patch and exit:

```
(gdb) set {unsigned char} 0x804856f = 0x7f
(gdb) quit
```

Let’s Attack!

Let's crack!

- Let's get a feel for the types of techniques attackers typically use.
- Our example cracking target will be the DRM player.
- Our chief cracking tool will be the `gdb` debugger.

Step 1: Learn about the executable

```
> file player
player: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, dynamically linked

> objdump -T player
DYNAMIC SYMBOL TABLE:
0xa4    scanf
0x90    fprintf
0x12    time

> objdump -x player | egrep 'rodata|text|Name'
Name              Size      VMA               LMA               File off
.text             0x4f8     0x4006a0  0x4006a0  0x6a0
.rodata           0x84      0x400ba8  0x400ba8  0xba8

> objdump -f player | grep start
start address 0x4006a0
```

Step 2: Breaking on library functions

- Treat the program as a black box
- Feed it inputs to see how it behaves.

```
> player 0xca7ca115 1 2 3 4
Please enter activation code: 42
expired!
Segmentation fault
```

- Find the assembly code equivalent of

  `if (time(0) > some value)···`

- Replace it with

  `if (time(0) <= some value)···`

Example Program

```
27      int i;
28      for(i=0;i<media_len;i++) {
29          uint decrypted = *key ^ encrypted_media[i];
30          if (time(0) > 1221011472) die("expired");
31          float decoded = (float)decrypted;
32          fprintf(audio,"%f\n",decoded); fflush(audio);
33      }
34  }
```

Breaking on library functions






```
> gdb   write
> break time
> bt
> set ... 0x7e
> quit
```

Step 2: Breaking on library functions

At 0x4008bc is the offending conditional branch:

```
> gdb -write -silent --args player 0xca7ca115 \
                         1000 2000 3000 4000
(gdb) break time
Breakpoint 1 at 0x400680
(gdb) run
Please enter activation code: 42
Breakpoint 1, 0x400680 in time()
(gdb) where 2
#0  0x400680 in time
#1  0x4008b6 in ??
(gdb) up
#1  0x4008b6 in ??
(gdb) disassemble $pc-5 $pc+7
0x4008b1    callq   0x400680
0x4008b6    cmp     $0x48c72810,%rax
0x4008bc    jle     0x4008c8
```

X86 condition codes

CCCC	Name	Means
0000	O	overflow
0001	NO	Not overflow
0010	C/B/NAE	Carry, below, not above nor equal
0011	NC/AE/NB	Not carry, above or equal, not below
0100	E/Z	Equal, zero
0101	NE/NZ	Not equal, not zero
0110	BE/NA	Below or equal, not above
0111	A/NBE	Above, not below nor equal
1000	S	Sign (negative)
1001	NS	Not sign
1010	P/PE	Parity, parity even
1011	NP/PO	Not parity, parity odd
1100	L/NGE	Less, not greater nor equal
1101	GE/NL	Greater or equal, not less
1110	LE/NG	Less or equal, not greater
1111	G/NLE	Greater, not less nor equal

Step 2: Breaking on library functions

Patch the executable:

- replace the `jle` with a `jg` (x86 opcode 0x7f)

```
(gdb) set {unsigned char}0x4008bc = 0x7f
(gdb) disassemble 0x4008bc 0x4008be
0x4008bc   jg      0x4008c8
```

Step 3: Static pattern-matching

- search the executable for character strings.

```
> player 0xca7ca115 1000 2000 3000 4000
tampered!
Please enter activation code: 99
wrong code!
Segmentation fault
```

Example Program

```
19 uint play(uint user_key,
20            uint encrypted_media[],
21            int media_len) {
22   int code;
23   printf("Please enter activation code: ");
24   scanf("%i",&code);
25   if (code!=activation_code) die("wrong code");
26
27   *key = user_key ^ player_key;
```

Static pattern-matching

```
msg:
  .ascii "wrong!"

---------------------

if (wrong_code)
   printf(msg)
```

```
> gdb
> find "wrong!"
found at 0x0b9a
> find 0x0b9a
found at 0x6a3c
> disas
```

Step 3: Static pattern-matching

- the code that checks the activation code looks something like this:

```
addr1:    .ascii "wrong code"
          ...
          cmp    read_value,activation_code
          je     somewhere
addr2:    move   addr1, reg0
          call   printf
```

Step 3: Static pattern-matching

1. search the data segment to find address `addr1` where `"wrong code"` is allocated.
2. search through the text segment for an instruction that contains that address as a literal:

```
(gdb) find 0x400ba8,+0x84,"wrong code"
0x400be2
(gdb) find 0x4006a0,+0x4f8,0x400be2
0x400862
(gdb) disassemble 0x40085d 0x400867
0x40085d     cmp    %eax,%edx
0x40085f     je     0x40086b
0x400861     mov    $0x400be2,%edi
0x400866     callq  0x4007e0
```

Step 5: Recovering internal data

1. ask the debugger to print out decrypted media data!

```
(gdb) hbreak *0x4008a6
(gdb) commands
>x/x -0x8+$rbp
>continue
>end
(gdb) cont
Please enter activation code: 42
Breakpoint 2, 0x4008a6
0x7fffffffdc88: 0xbabec99d
Breakpoint 2, 0x4008a6
0x7fffffffdc88: 0xbabecda5
            ...
```

Recovering internal data




```
> gdb
> watch audio
> when break
    print audio
```

Step 6: Tampering with the environment

1. To avoid triggering the timeout, wind back the system clock!
2. Change the library search path to force the program to pick up hacked libraries!
3. Hack the OS (we'll see this later).

Tampering with the environment

```
if (time()>...)
  abort()
```

```
> set time
19551112,10:04pm

> player
```

Step 8: Differential attacks

1. Find two differently fingerprinted copies of the program
2. Diff them!

```
asm (
    "jmp L1                    \n\t"
    ".align 4                  \n\t"
    ".long      0xb0b5b0b5\n\t"
    "L1:                       \n\t"
);
```

```
asm (
    "jmp L1                    \n\t"
    ".align 4                  \n\t"
    ".long      0xada5ada5\n\t"
    "L1:                       \n\t"
);
```

Differential attacks

```
user:
   .ascii "BOB"
```

```
user:
   .ascii "CA "
```

```
> vbindiff p1 p2
```

"I AM BOB!"

"I AM CAL!"


player3-static-stripped-opt
0000 03C0: 33 1D 42 8D 28 00 48 8B 05 43 8D 28 00 45 85 ED 3.B.(.H. .C.(.E..
0000 03D0: 89 18 0F 8E 98 00 00 00 31 DB EB 46 0F 1F 40 00 .... 1..F..@.
0000 03E0: 44 89 E0 48 8B 3D 86 C6 28 00 BE 83 75 46 00 31 D..H.=.. (...uF.1
0000 03F0: E8 48 83 C3 01 F3 48 0F 2A C0 B8 01 00 00 00 0F .H....H. *.......
0000 0400: 14 C0 0F 5A C0 E8 A6 15 00 00 48 8B 3D 5F C6 28 ...Z.... ..H.=_.(
0000 0410: 00 E8 6A 17 00 00 41 39 DD 7E 55 48 8B 05 EE 8C ..j...A9 .~UH....
0000 0420: 28 00 44 8B 20 41 8B 2C 9E EB 05 90 B5 B0 B5 B0 (.D. A.,
0000 0430: 31 FF E8 C9 14 01 00 48 3D 10 CB A8 5A 7E A1 48 1.....H =...Z~.H
0000 0440: 8B 3D D2 93 28 00 BA 8E D0 47 00 BE 70 75 46 00 .=..(... .G..puF.
0000 0450: 31 C0 E8 59 15 00 00 48 C7 05 AE 8C 28 00 00 00 1..Y...H ....(...
0000 0460: 00 00 E9 79 FF FF FF 66 0F 1F 84 00 00 00 00 00 ...y...f ....
0000 0470: 48 83 C4 10 5B 5D 41 5C 41 5D 41 5E C3 0F 1F 00 H...[]A\ A]A^....
player3A-static-stripped-opt
0000 03C0: 33 1D 42 8D 28 00 48 8B 05 43 8D 28 00 45 85 ED 3.B.(.H. .C.(.E..
0000 03D0: 89 18 0F 8E 98 00 00 00 31 DB EB 46 0F 1F 40 00 .... 1..F..@.
0000 03E0: 44 89 E0 48 8B 3D 86 C6 28 00 BE 83 75 46 00 31 D..H.=.. (...uF.1
0000 03F0: E8 48 83 C3 01 F3 48 0F 2A C0 B8 01 00 00 00 0F .H....H. *.......
0000 0400: 14 C0 0F 5A C0 E8 A6 15 00 00 48 8B 3D 5F C6 28 ...Z.... ..H.=_.(
0000 0410: 00 E8 6A 17 00 00 41 39 DD 7E 55 48 8B 05 EE 8C ..j...A9 .~UH....
0000 0420: 28 00 44 8B 20 41 8B 2C 9E EB 05 90 A5 AD A5 AD (.D. A.,
0000 0430: 31 FF E8 C9 14 01 00 48 3D 10 CB A8 5A 7E A1 48 1.....H =...Z~.H
0000 0440: 8B 3D D2 93 28 00 BA 8E D0 47 00 BE 70 75 46 00 .=..(... .G..puF.
0000 0450: 31 C0 E8 59 15 00 00 48 C7 05 AE 8C 28 00 00 00 1..Y...H ....(...
0000 0460: 00 00 E9 79 FF FF FF 66 0F 1F 84 00 00 00 00 00 ...y...f ....
0000 0470: 48 83 C4 10 5B 5D 41 5C 41 5D 41 5E C3 0F 1F 00 H...[]A\ A]A^....
Arrow keys move F find RET next difference ESC quit T move top
C ASCII/EBCDIC E edit file G goto position Q quit B move bottom

Step 9: Decompilation

```
L080482A0(A8, Ac, A10) {
    ebx = A8;
    esp = "Please enter activation code: ";
    eax = L080499C0();
    V4 = ebp - 16;
    *esp = 0x80a0831;
    eax = L080499F0();
    eax = *(ebp - 16);
    if(eax != *L080BE2CC) {
        V8 = "wrong code";
        V4 = 0x80a082c;
        *esp = *L080BE704;
        eax = L08049990();
        *L080BE2C8 = 0;
    }
```

Example Program

```
19 uint play(uint user_key,
20            uint encrypted_media[],
21            int media_len) {
22   int code;
23   printf("Please enter activation code: ");
24   scanf("%i",&code);
25   if (code!=activation_code) die("wrong code");
26
27   *key = user_key ^ player_key;
```

```
    eax = *L080BE2C8;
    edi = 0;
    ebx = ebx ^ *L080BE2C4;
    *eax = ebx;
    eax = A10;
    if(eax <= 0) {} else {
        while(1) {
            esi = *(Ac + edi * 4);
L08048368:  *esp = 0;
            if(L08056DD0() > 1521011472) {
                V8 = "expired";
                V4 = 0x80a082c;
                *esp = *L080BE704;
                L08049990();
                *L080BE2C8 = 0;
            }
```

Example Program

```
 1  typedef unsigned int uint;
 2  typedef uint* waddr_t;
 3  uint player_key = 0xbabeca75;
 4  uint the_key;
 5  uint* key = &the_key;
 6  FILE* audio;
 7  int activation_code = 42;
 8
 9  void FIRST_FUN(){}
10  uint hash (waddr_t addr, waddr_t last) {
11      uint h = *addr;
12      for(;addr<=last;addr++) h^=*addr;
13      return h;
14  }
15  void die(char* msg) {
16      fprintf(stderr,"%s!\n",msg);
17      key = NULL;
18  }
```

```
            ebx = ebx ^ esi;
            (save)0;
            edi = edi + 1;
            (save)ebx;
            esp = esp + 8;
            V8 = *esp;
            V4 = "%f\n"; *esp = *L080C02C8;
            eax = L08049990();
            eax = *L080C02C8;
            *esp = eax;
            eax = L08049A20();
            if(edi == A10) {goto L080483a7;}
            eax = *L080BE2C8; ebx = *eax;
        }
        ch = 176; ch = 176;
        goto L08048368;
    }
L080483a7:
}
```

```
L080483AF(A8, Ac) {
    ...
    ecx = 0x8048260;
    edx = 0x8048230;
    eax = *L08048230;
    if(0x8048260 >= 0x8048230) {
        do {
            eax = eax ^ *edx;
            edx = edx + 4;
        } while(ecx >= edx);
    }
    if(eax != 318563869) {
        V8 = "tampered";
        V4 = 0x80a082c;
        *esp = *L080BE704;
        L08049990();
        *L080BE2C8 = 0;
    }
    V8 = A8 - 2;
    V4 = ebp + -412;
    *esp = *(ebp + -416);
    return(L080482A0());
}
```

Example Program

```
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 4  uint the_key;
 5  uint* key = &the_key;
 6  FILE* audio;
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 9  void FIRST_FUN(){}
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11      uint h = *addr;
12      for(;addr<=last;addr++) h^=*addr;
13      return h;
14  }
15  void die(char* msg) {
16      fprintf(stderr,"%s!\n",msg);
17      key = NULL;
18  }
```

Discussion

What can the attacker do?

- Pattern-match on static code and execution patterns.

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What can the attacker do?

- Pattern-match on static code and execution patterns.
- Disassemble/decompile machine code.
- Debug binary code without source code.
- Compare two related program versions.
- Modify the executable.
- Tamper with the execution environment.

In-Class Exercise

- Alice writes a program that she only wants Bob to execute 5 times.
- At the end of each run, the program writes a file `.AliceSecretCount` with the number of runs so far.
- At the beginning of each run, the program reads the file `.AliceSecretCount` and, if the number of runs so far is ≥ 5, it exits with an error message `BAD BOB!`.
- Draw a detailed attack tree with all attacks available to Bob!

Exercises

1. Exercise 1 is on the website:

`www.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg/`

`Teaching/bsuir/2014`

Next week's lecture

1. Static analysis
2. Obfuscation algorithms
3. Please check the website for important announcements:

`www.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg/`

`Teaching/bsuir/2014`